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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the introduction of groupware into an
organization to understand the changes in work practices
and social interaction facilitated by the technology. The
results suggest that people's mental models and
organizations' structure and culture significantly influence
how groupware is implemented and used. Specifically, in
the absence of mental models that stressed its
collaborative nature, groupware was intepreted in terms of
familiar personal, stand-alone technologies such as
spreadsheets. Further, the culture and structure provided
few incentives or norms for cooperating or sharing
expertise, hence the groupware on its own was unlikely to
engender collaboration. Recognizing the central influence
of these cognitive and organizational elements is critical
to developers, researchers, and practitioners of groupware.
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INTRODUCTION
Computer-supported cooperative work, collaborative
computing, and groupware have become common labels
in our contemporary technological vocabulary. While
some have discussed the potential for such technologies to
enhance organizational effectiveness [3, 8, 9, 15], others
have suggested that the implementation of such
technologies is more difficult and yields more unintended
consequences than is typically acknowledged [2, 10, 11,
12, 16]. Empirical studies of groupware usage in
organizations are clearly needed to shed light on these
diverse expectations. While there have been many field
studies of electronic mail usage [1, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 17],
groupware (that includes more collaborative features than
electronic mail) has been studied less frequently.
In this paper I describe the findings of an exploratory field
study which examined the implementation of the
groupware product Notes® (from Lotus Development
Corporation)' into one office of a large organization. My
interest in studying the implementation and use of this
product was to investigate whether and how the use of a
collaborative tool changes the nature of work and the
pattern of social interactions in the office, and with what
intended and unintended consequences. The findings
suggest that two organizational elements seem especially
relevant in influencing the effective utilization of
groupware: people's cognitions or mental models about
technology and their work, and the structural properties of
the organization such as policies, norms, and reward
systems. The findings suggest that where people's mental
models do not understand or appreciate the collaborative
nature of groupware, such technologies will be intepreted
and used as if they were more familiar technologies, such
as personal, stand-alone software (e.g., a spreadsheet or
word processing program). The findings further suggest,
that where the premises underlying the groupware
technology (shared effort, cooperation, collaboration) are
counter-cultural to an organization's structural properties
(competitive and individualistic culture, rigid hierarchy,
etc.), the technology will be unlikely to facilitate
collective use and value. That is, where there are few
incentives or norms for cooperating or sharing expertise,
goupware technology alone cannot engender these.
Conversely, where the structural properties do support
shared effort, cooperation, and collaboration, it is likely
that the technology will be used collaboratively, that is, it
will be another medium within which those values and
norms are expressed. Recognizing the significant influence
of these organizational elements appears critical to
groupware developers, users, and researchers.
1 Notes is an application development environment that can
support communication, coordination, and collaboration
within groups or organizations. While some features such
as electronic mail are built-in, others need to be built by
the adopting organization, e.g. discussion forums and
customized views of shared databases. See Marshak (1990)
for more details.
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RESEARCH SITE AND METHODS
Field work was conducted within a large services firm,
Alpha Corporation (a pseudonym), which provides
consulting services to clients around the world. The career
structure within Alpha is hierarchical with four primary
milestones--staff consultant, senior consultant, manager,
and principal. In contrast to the pyramidal career structure,
the firm operates through a matrix form, with client work
being executed and managed in a decentralized fashion out
of local offices, while being coordinated through
consulting practice management centralized in the
headquarters office.
A few years ago, Alpha purchased and distributed Notes to
all their consultants and support staff as part of a strategy,
described by a senior principal as an attempt to "leverage
the expertise of our firm." My research study examined the
implementation of Notes in one large office of Alpha over
a period of five months.2 Detailed data collection was
conducted through unstructured interviews, review of
office documents, and observation of meetings, work
sessions, and training classes. Over ninety interviews were
conducted, each about an hour in length, with some
participants being interviewed more than once over the
period of study. In addition to the office where the study
was conducted, I interviewed key players from Alpha's
headquarters and technology group. Participants spanned
various hierarchical levels and were either consultants in
active practice, administrators supporting practice
activities, or members of the centralized technology
support function (see Table 1).
Practice Technology Total
Principals 13 4 17
Managers 26 15 41
Seniors 12 13 25
Admin. 8 -- 8
Total 59 32 91
Table 1: Number and Type of Interviews in Alpha
The research study was designed to examine how the
groupware technology is adopted and used by individuals,
and how work and social relations change as a
consequence. The research study began in February 1991
before the Notes system was due to be installed within the
office and continued through the implementation and early
use of the Notes system (June 1991). The findings reflect
participants' anticipations of as well as their early
exposure to the Notes system.3 These findings need to be
2 henceforth referred to simply as "the office."
3 This research study represents the first of a series of studies
that are being conducted within Alpha over time. Further
analyses and observations are thus anticipated.
interpreted cautiously as they only reflect the adoption and
early use experiences of a sample of individuals within a
specific office in what is a larger implementation process
continuing over time in Alpha. While early, the findings
to date are interesting as they reflect people's initial
experiences and assessments of Notes in light of their
current work practices and assumptions about technology.
The initial period following the implementation of a
technology is typically a brief and rare opportunity for
users to examine and think about the technology as a
discrete artifact, before it is assimilated into cognitive
habits and work practices, and disappears from view [18].
It is possible that with time, greater use, and appropriate
circumstances, these early experiences will change.
RESEARCH RESULTS
Background to the Notes Acquisition
In the late eighties, a few senior principals realized that
Alpha, relative to its competitors and clients'
expectations, was not utilizing information technology as
effectively as they could. In response, they commissioned
an internal study of the firm's technological capabilities,
weaknesses, and requirements. On the basis of this study's
recommendations, a new and powerful position--akin to
that of a Chief Information Officer (CIO)--was created
within Alpha with responsibility for the firm's internal
use of information technology. One of the first tasks the
new CIO took on was the creation of firm-wide standards
for the personal computing environments utilized in
Alpha offices. It was while reviewing communication
software that the CIO was introduced to the Notes
groupware system. As he remarked later, after a few days
of "playing with Notes," he quickly realized that it was "a
breakthrough technology," with the potential to create "a
revolution" in how members of Alpha communicated and
coordinated their activities. Shortly thereafter the CIO
acquired a site license to install Notes throughout the
firm, and announced that the product would be Alpha's
communications standard.
The CIO began to market Notes energetically within
various arenas of the firm. He gave numerous talks to
principals and managers, both at national meetings and in
local offices, during which he promoted his vision of how
Notes "can help us manage our expertise and transform
our practice." Through interest and persuasion, demand for
Notes grew, and the physical deployment of the
technology proceeded rapidly throughout the firm. The
actual use of Notes within the office I studied, however,
appeared to be advancing more slowly. While electronic
mail usage had been adopted widely and enthusiastically,
the use of Notes to share expertise, and the integration of
Notes into work practices and policies had not yet been
accomplished. The data I collected and analyzed during my
field study of one office suggests that at least two
organizational elements--cognitive and structural--
influenced the participants' adoption, understanding, and
early use of Notes.
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Cognitive Elements
Cognitive elements are the mental models or frames of
references that individuals have about the world, their
organization, work, technology, and so on. While these
frames are held by individuals, many assumptions and
values constituting the frames tend to be shared with
others. Such sharing of cognitions is facilitated by
common educational and professional backgrounds, work
experiences, and regular interaction. In the context of
groupware, those cognitive elements that have to do with
information technology become particularly salient.
Elsewhere, I have termed these technological frames, and
described how they shape the way information technology
is designed and used in organizations [7].
When confronted with a new technology, individuals try
to understand it in terms of their existing technological
frames, often augmenting these frames to accommodate
special aspects of the technology. If the technology is
sufficiently different, however, these existing frames may
be inappropriate, and individuals will need to significantly
modify their technological frames in order to understand or
interact effectively with the new technology. How users
change their technological frames in response to a new
technology is influenced by (i) the kind and amount of
product information communicated to them, and (ii) the
nature and form of training they receive on the product.
(i) Communication about Notes
Employees in the office I studied received relatively little
communication about Notes. Many of them first heard
about the CIO's decision to standardize on Notes through
the trade press. Others encountered it during Alpha's
annual management seminars that form part of
consultants' continuing education program. Most
encountered it for the first time when it was installed on
their computers. Without explicit information about what
Notes is and why Alpha had purchased it, these individuals
were left to make their own assumptions about the
technology and why it was being distributed. This
contributed to weakly developed technological frames
around Notes in the office. Consider, for example, these
remarks made by individuals a few weeks before Notes
was to be installed on their computers:
I know absolutely nothing about Notes. I don't know
what it is supposed to do.
All I know is the firm bought it, but I don't know why.
I first heard that the firm had bought Notes through the
Wall Street Journal. Then your study was the next
mention of it. That's all I know about it.
I heard about Notes at the [management seminars] about
eight months ago. I still don't know what it is.
It has something to do with communications.
It's big email.
I've heard that it's hard copy of email ... but I am not
very clear about what it is exactly.
Is it a new version of 1-2-3?
I believe Notes is putting word processing power into
spreadsheets.
It's a network... I don't know how the network works.
Where does all this information go after I switch my
machine off?
It's a database housed somewhere in the center of the
universe.
Weakly developed technological frames of a new and
different technology are a significant problem in
technology transfer because people act towards technology
on the basis of the meaning it has for them. If people
have a poor or inappropriate understanding of the unique
and different features of a new technology they may resist
using it, or may not integrate it appropriately into their
work practices. In the office, one consequence of such
poor understanding was a skepticism towards Notes and its
capabilities. For example, principals and managers in the
office commented:
I first heard about Notes when I read in the Wall Street
Journal that Alpha had purchased a revolutionary new
piece of software. My first thought was -- how much is
this costing me personally? ... [T]his kind of
implementation affects all of our pocketbooks. ... I
have [heard that] there is no value in information
technology -- so you can imagine how Ifeel!
When I first heard about it, I thought "Oh yeah? First
hook me up to the network, and then I'll listen." Right
now I still can't see the benefit.
I don't believe that Notes will help our business that
much, unless all of our business is information transfer.
It's not. Business is based on relationships. Ideas are
created in non-work situations, socially, over lunch, etc.
Poor circulation of information about Notes was a
consequence of the rapid installation of Notes that Alpha
had pursued. The CIO had delegated responsibility for
Notes deployment to the firm's technology group.
Because demand for Notes was growing quickly, the
technologists did not have an opportunity to plan the
Notes rollout, and did not develop or pursue a formal
implementation plan or information dissemination
strategy. Two technology managers commented:
We tried to stay one step ahead of the firm's demand and
[the CIO's] evangelism. We were swamped with
requests. Every time [the CIO] gave a talk, we'd be
deluged with requests for Notes. ... We had no time to
do a formal plan or a grand strategy because [the CIO]
had raised the level of enthusiasm in the firm, and there
was no way we could say to the principals "wait while
we get our act together."
[The CIOJ set the tone for the deployment strategy by
generating interest in the product at the top. He was
pushing a top-down approach, getting to all the
principals first. So our deployment was driven by a lot
of user pull and a little push from us. ... We were
constantly struggling to keep up with demand.
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This rapid, demand-driven rollout was consistent with the
CIO's assumption about how technologies such as Notes
should be implemented. He commented that:
Our strategy was to blast Notes through our
organization as quickly as possible, with no prototypes,
no pilots, no lengthy technical evaluation. We want to
transform the way we deliver service to clients.
He believed that an "empowering" technology such as
Notes should be put in the hands of as many people as
possible, and that if the technology is compelling enough
"they will drift into new ways of doing things." That is,
[l]f you believe that Notes is a competitive technology
you have to deploy it quickly, and put it in the hands of
the users as fast as possible. Critical mass is key.
In particular, the CIO focused on convincing the key
"opinion leaders" in the firm of the value of the
technology, as he believed that these individuals would
lead the charge in defining and spreading the uses of Notes
throughout the firm.
(ii) Training on Notes
Training users on new technology is central to their
understanding of its capabilities and appreciating how it
differs from other technologies with which they are
familiar. It also significantly influences the augmentation
of existing technological frames or the development of
new ones. Because the technologists were extremely busy
deploying Notes and keeping it up and running, they did
not have the resources to pay much attention to the
education of users. Their first priority was to physically
install hundreds of copies of Notes in multiple offices
around the country and keep them operational. As one
technology manager noted, it was a matter of priorities:
We made a conscious decision between whether we
should throw it [Notes] to the users versus spending a
lot of time training. We decided on the former.
The under-emphasis on training was consistent with the
CIO's general view that Notes does not require formal end-
user training, and that it is through experimentation and
use, not formal education programs that people begin to
appreciate a technology's potential and learn to use it in
different and interesting ways. This user-driven diffusion
strategy, however, typically takes time, particularly in a
busy services firm with considerable production pressures.
Because this study did not detect any new user initiatives
around the use of Notes in the office, it is possible that
the timing of the research is simply too early in the
implementation process. The following experiences thus
represent the first encounters consultants had with Notes
and how they initially appropriated it.
The training that was made available to users in the office
I studied came in two forms, self-study and classroom
training. The former provided users with a videotape and
work-book, and covered Notes' basic functions and
interfaces. The latter offered up to four hours of
instruction and hands-on exercises by local computer
support personnel. None of these training options
emphasized its collaborative nature or possible business
value. The training materials were relatively technical,
individual-oriented, and non-specific in content. Trainees
were exposed to the basic Notes functions such as
electronic mail, editing, and database browsing. While
facilitating the accessibility of the material to all
individuals, from secretaries to principals, this "one size
fits all" training strategy had the effect--at least initially--
of not conveying the power of Notes to support specific
consulting applications or group coordination.
This training on Notes resembled that of the training
conducted on personal productivity tools. While useful for
teaching the mechanics of Notes, it does not give users a
new way of thinking differently about their work in terms
of groupware. While Alpha was less concerned with
collaborative or group work than with sharing expertise
across the firm, the effect of the initial training was that
participants in my study attempted to understand Notes
through their existing frame of personal computing
software. Such interpretations encouraged thinking about
Notes as an individual productivity tool rather than as a
collaborative technology or a forum for sharing ideas. For
example, one manager noted:
I see Notes as a personal communication tool. That is,
with a modem and fax applications I can do work at
home or at a client site and use Notes to transfer work
back and forth. In the office, instead of getting my
secretary to make twenty copies of a memo she can just
push a button.
Further, the applications built for users by the technology
group tended to automate existing information flows
rather than creating new ones through the cooperative
features of Notes. This reinforced the message that users
received in their training, that Notes is an incremental
rather than a transforming technology, and that new
technological frames or new work practices around it are
not required. Thus, in contrast to the technologists' vision
of Notes as a technology that can "fundamentally change
the way we do business," consultants in the office
appeared to expect, at most, incremental improvements in
operations. A manager noted:
The general perception of Notes is that it is an efficient
tool, making what we do now better, but it is not
viewed by the organization as a major change.
Remember we're ... a management consulting firm and
management consultants stick to management issues.
We don't get into technology issues.
Another said:
I think it will reduce the time of gathering information.
I think it will cut down on frustration in transferring
information. But it is not a radical change.
As a result of the lack of resources that technologists had
for communication and training, users of Notes in the
office developed technological frames that either had
weakly developed notions of Notes, or that interpreted
Notes as a personal rather than a group or firm
productivity tool. Because technological frames may
change over time and with changing contexts, it is
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possible that the frames developed by the office
participants will change over time. For example, if
individuals are exposed to other applications of Notes
developed elsewhere in the firm or in other firms, or if
their increased use of Notes helps them understand how
they can change the way they work, new understandings
and uses of Notes may result. Our ongoing study of this
implementation will monitor such possible developments.
Structural Elements
Structural properties of organizations encompass the
reward systems, policies, work practices, and norms that
shape and are shaped by the everyday action of
organizational members. In the office, three such
structural properties significantly influenced individuals'
perceptions and early use of Notes.
(i) Reward Systems
Within Alpha there is an expectation--shared by many
services firms--that all or most employee hours should be
"billable," that is, charged to clients. This is a major
evaluation criterion on which employees are assessed, and
employees studiously avoid "non-billable hours." Because
most of the participants did not initially perceive using
Notes as a client-related activity (and hence as "not
chargeable"), they were disinclined to spend time on it.
Further, given their lack of understanding and skepticism
of Notes, they were unwilling to give up personal time to
learn or use it. Consider these comments from senior
consultants and managers:
One of the problems is time. Given my billing rate, it
makes no sense for me to take the time to learn the
technology. In Alpha we put so much emphasis on
chargeable hours and that puts a lot of pressure on
managers. ... And now we've made an enormous
commitment to Notes and Hardware, and LANs, but we
haven't given people the time and opportunity to learn
it. For them to do classes they have to work extra on
weekends to meet deadlines.
I think it is going to be a real issue to find time to use
Notes. We don't have the time to read or enter
information in Notes. What would I charge it to? We
already complain that we can't charge our reading of our
mail to anything. We end up having to charge it to
ourselves [he reads his mail on the train going home].
I don't think that Notes will ever be used in Alpha as
effectively as it could be. We're not going to make sure
everyone in the office has fifteen hours over the next
year to spend time learning it. And if they expect us to
take it out of our own time I'm not going to invest that
time. I have another life too.
The opportunity costs for me to take training in the
office are very high. At my level, every week is a
deadline, every week is a crisis. No accommodations are
made in our schedules or workload to allow us to train
on technology. So I won't learn it unless it's
mandatory.
Thus, one significant inhibitor of learning and using
Notes was the office's reward system with its
accompanying incentive schemes and evaluation criteria.
Because the reward system had not changed since the
implementation of Notes, consultants in the office
perceived time spent on Notes as less legitimate than
client work. While many used Notes for electronic mail or
database browsing, these activities amounted to a few
minutes a day, and hence were easily subsumed into client
or personal time. However, any more extensive use of
Notes was seen as potentially disrupting the balance
between billable hours and personal time, and hence to be
avoided. These concerns, however, varied by position in
the office. Not surprisingly, principals were willing to
take a longer-term and firm-wide perspective on Notes,
being less preoccupied than were managers and senior
consultants with time constraints, "billable hours,"
personal performance, and their own careers.
(ii) Policies and Procedures
Along with the few resources dedicated to Notes training
and communication, the office--at the time of my study--
had not formulated new work procedures or set new
policies around data quality, confidentiality, and access
control. Many participants indicated that their use of
Notes was inhibited by their lack of knowledge about
these issues, particularly concerns about liability (their
own and Alpha's). Principals for example, worried about
data security:
Security is a concern for me. ... We need to worry about
who is seeing the data. ... Managers should not be able
to access all the information even if it is useful, [such
as] financial information to clients, because they leave
and may go and work for competitors. So there should
be prohibitions on information access.
I am not sure how secure Notes is. Many times we have
run into difficulties and things have got lost in never-
never land.
I have concerns about what goes into the databases and
who has access to them and what access they have....
But we haven't thought that through yet.
Managers and senior consultants in the office were more
anxious about personal liability or embarrassment:
I would be careful what I put out on Notes though. I
like to retain personal control so that when people call
me I can tell them not to use it for such and such. But
there is no such control within Notes.
My other concern is that information changes a lot. So
if I put out a memo saying X today and then have a new
memo two weeks later, the person accessing the
information may not know about the second memo
which had canceled the first. Also if you had a personal
discussion you could explain the caveats and the
interpretations and how they should and shouldn't use
the information.
I'd be more fearful that I'd put something out there and
it was wrong and somebody would catch it.
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I would be concerned in using Notes that I would come
to the wrong conclusion and others would see it. What
would make me worry is that it was public information
and people were using it and what if it was wrong? I
would not want to be cited by someone who hasn't
talked to me first. I'm worried that my information
would be misconstrued and it would end up in Wichita,
Kansas "as per J. Brown in New York" being used and
relied on. You should be able to limit what access
people have to what information, particularly if is your
information. I would definitely want to know who was
looking at it.
There is a hesitancy here because you don't want to put
everything into public information as people may rely
on that information and screw up, and it may reflect
badly on you.
The lack of explicit procedures and policies around Notes
highlights the difficulty of enforcing firm-wide policies in
a decentralized firm. While the CIO has been able to
institute standards around certain technology platforms--
clearly a technical domain, instituting standard procedures
and policies about data quality, control, and liability
begins to encroach on the organizational domain--an arena
where the CIO's authority is less established. As a result,
the technologists have been careful about setting policies
that would require organizational changes and that might
invoke turf issues. Managers of local offices, however,
had not devoted any attention to this issue, at least in the
early adoption phase. As a result, there was some
ambiguity about the locus and nature of responsibility and
liability with respect to the intellectual content of Notes
databases. This may have inhibited the application of
Notes to a broader range of work practices in the early
phase of implementation.
(iii) Firm Culture and Work Norms
Alpha shares with many other consulting firms a
relatively competitive culture--at least at the levels below
principal. The pyramidal structure and the hierarchical "up
or out" career path promote and reinforce an individualistic
culture among consultants, where those who have not yet
attained principal status vie with each other to get the
relatively few promotions handed out each year. In such a
competitive culture, there are few norms around
cooperating or sharing knowledge with peers. These
comments by consultants in the office are illustrative:
This is definitely a competitive culture--it's an up or
out atmosphere.
Usually managers work alone because of the
competitiveness among the managers. There is a lot of
one-upmanship against each other. Their life dream is to
become a principal in Alpha, and they' II do anything to
get there.
The atmosphere is competitive and cut-throat; all they
want is to get ahead as individuals.
Interestingly, there was some evidence that there is much
more collegiality at the highest levels of the firm, where
principals--having attained tenure and the highest career
rank--enact more of a "fraternal culture" than the
competitive individualism evident at lower levels. This is
also evident in service organizations with similar
organizational structures, such as firms providing legal,
accounting, or medical services. Below the principal level,
however, managers and senior consultants in my study
indicated that there was generally little precedent for
sharing or cooperating with colleagues, and little incentive
to do so as they needed to differentiate themselves from
their peers. For example:
The corporate psychology makes the use of Notes
difficult. Particularly the consultant career path which
creates a back-stabbing and aggressive environment.
People aren't backstabbing consciously, it's just that
the environment makes people maximize opportunities
for themselves.
I'm trying to develop an area of expertise that makes me
stand out. Ifl shared that with you you'd get the credit
not me.... It's really a cut-throat environment.
Power in this firm is your client base and technical
ability. ... It is definitely a function of consulting
firms. Now if you put all this information in a Notes
database you lose power. There will be nothing that's
privy to you, so you will lose power. It's important
that I am selling something that no one else has. When
I hear people talk about the importance of sharing
expertise in the firm, I say "Reality is a nice construct."
The competitive individualism--which reinforces
individual effort and ability, and does not support
cooperation or sharing of expertise--is counter-cultural to
the underlying premise of groupware technologies. It is
thus not surprising that, at all but the highest career level,
Notes is being used largely as an individual productivity
tool in the office. Senior consultants and managers within
this office feel little incentive to share their ideas for fear
that they may lose status, power, and distinctive
competence. Principals, on the other hand, do not share
this fear and are more focused on the interests of the office
and the firm than on their individual careers. An
interesting contrast to this point, which further supports
it, is that Notes is being used by Alpha technologists to
exchange technical expertise. Not being subject to the
competitive culture, individual-focused reward systems,
"up-or-out" career pressures, and "chargeable hours"
constraints of the consultants, the technologists appear to
have been able to use the technology to conduct their
work, that is, solving technical problems.
DISCUSSION
The results of this research suggest that the organizational
introduction of groupware will interact with cognitive and
structural elements, and that these elements will have
significant implications for the adoption, understanding,
and early use of the technology. Because people act
towards technology on the basis of their understanding of
it, people's technological frames often need to be changed
to accommodate a new technology. Where people do not
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appreciate the premises and purposes of a technology they
may use it in less effective ways. A major premise
underlying groupware is the coordination of activities and
people across time and space. For many users, such a
premise may represent a radically different understanding
of technology than they have experienced before. This
suggests that a particularly central aspect of implementing
groupware is ensuring that prospective users have an
appropriate understanding of the technology, that is, that
their technological frames reflect a perception of the
technology as a collective rather than a personal tool.
At the time I conducted my study, many of the
participants in the office did not have a good conception of
what Notes was and how they could use it. Their
technological frames around Notes were weakly developed
and relied heavily on their knowledge and experience of
other individually-used technologies. Given such
cognitions, it is not surprising that in their early use of
the technology, these participants had not generated new
patterns of social interaction, nor had they developed
fundamentally different work practices around Notes.
Instead, they had either chosen not to use Notes, or had
subsumed it within prior technological frames and were
using it primarily to enhance personal productivity
through electronic mail, file transfer, or accessing news
services. As indicated above, however, these findings
reflect an early phase of the participants' experiences with
Notes. It is possible that these experiences will change
over time as they get more accustomed to using Notes,
and these are expected to change over time depending on
their ongoing experiences with the technology.
Where a new technological frame is desirable because the
technology is sufficiently unprecedented to require new
assumptions and meanings, communication and education
are central in fostering the development of new
technological frames. Such communication and education
should stress the required shift in technological frame, as
well as provide technical and logistic information on use.
A training approach that resembles that used for personal
computing software is unlikely to help individuals
develop an appreciation of groupware. For individuals used
to personal computing environments and individual
applications, shared technology use and cooperative
applications are difficult to grasp. In these cases, concrete
demonstrations of group applications can help to provide
insight. Further, learning groupware collectively may
foster joint understanding and expectations. Where
individuals learn a shared technology in isolation, they
may form their own assumptions, expectations, and
procedures which may differ from those of the people they
will interact with through the technology.
In situations where the premises underlying groupware are
incongruent with those of the organization's culture,
policies, and reward systems, it is unlikely that effective
cooperative computing will result without a change in
structural properties. Such changes are difficult to
accomplish, and usually meet with resistance. Without
such changes, however, the existing structural elements of
the firm will likely serve as significant barriers to the
desired use of the technology. For example, in the study
described above, the existing norms, policies, and rewards
appear to be in conflict with the premises of Notes.
Because incentive schemes and evaluation criteria in the
office had not been modified to encourage or accommodate
cooperation and expertise sharing through Notes, members
feared loss of power, control, prestige, and promotion
opportunities if they shared their ideas, or if their lack of
knowledge or misinterpretations were made visible. Thus,
in a relatively competitive culture where members are
evaluated and rewarded as individuals, there will be few
norms for sharing and cooperating. If groupware is to be
used cooperatively in such cultures, these norms need to
be changed--either inculcated top-down through training,
communication, leadership, and structural legitimation, or
bottom-up through support for local opportunities and
experimentation around cooperation. Without some such
grounding in shared norms, groupware will likely be used
primarily for advancing individual productivity.
In addition to norms, resources are a further important
facilitator of shared technology use. Whether formally ear-
marked from some firm-wide R&D budget, or provided
informally through local slack resources, occasions for
experimenting with shared applications are needed to
generate interest and use around cooperative computing. In
the office, for example, there had been no change in the
allocation of resources following the implementation of
Notes, and members had not been given time to use and
experiment with Notes. There was thus a tension between
the structural requirement that all work be production-
oriented, and the adoption of an infrastructure technology
such as Notes which was perceived to be only indirectly
related to production work. Where individuals are not
given resources to learn and experiment with the new
technology, or not given specific applications that help
them accomplish their production work within the
technology, the immediate pressures of daily production
tasks and deadlines will tend to dominate their decisions
around how they allocate their time.
This research study suggests that in the early adoption of a
technology, cognitive and structural elements play an
important role in influencing how people think about and
assess the value of the technology. And these significantly
influence how they choose to use the technology. When
an organization deploys a new technology with an intent
to make substantial changes in business processes,
people's technological frames and the organization's work
practices will likely require substantial change. An
interesting issue raised by this requirement is how to
anticipate the required structural and cognitive changes
when the technology is brand new. That is, how do you
devise a game plan if you have never played the game
before? This is particularly likely in the case of an
unprecedented technology such as groupware. One strategy
would be to deploy the technology widely in the belief
that through experimentation and use over time, creative
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ideas and innovations will flourish. Another strategy
would prototype the technology in a representative group
of the organization--on a pilot basis--and then deploy it to
the rest of the organization once the technology's
capabilities and implications are understood. This way the
required structural and cognitive changes learned through
the pilot can be transferred. Viewed in terms of these two
strategies, aspects of Alpha's adoption activites now
appear to resemble the former strategy. Our future studies
should indicate how successful this strategy has been.
It is worth noting that while the early use of Notes in the
office has proved more valuable for facilitating individual
productivity than for collective productivity, the
implementation of Notes has resulted in the installation of
an advanced and standardized technology infrastructure. As
one technology manager put it: "A side-benefit of Notes is
that it got people into a more sophisticated environment
of computing than we could have done otherwise." Most
of the office members--from principals to senior
consultants--now have ready and easy access to a network
of personal computers and laser printers. Thus, while the
initial experiences with Notes in the office may not have
significantly changed work practices or policies, the office
appears to be relatively well-positioned to use this
platform to take advantage of any future technological or
work-related initiatives.
In general, the findings presented here provide insight for
future research into the structural and cognitive
organizational elements that interact with and shape the
adoption and early use of groupware in organizations.
They also have practical implications, indicating how and
where such organizational elements might be managed to
more effectively implement groupware in various
organizational circumstances.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Support from MIT's Center for Coordination Science is
gratefully acknowledged. Jolene Galegher, Bob Halperin,
Tom Malone, and Judith Quillard provided helpful
comments on an earlier version of the paper. Thanks are
also due to the participants from Alpha Corporation.
REFERENCES
1. Bair, J.H. and Gale, S. An Investigation of the
COORDINATOR as an Example of CSCW, Proc.
CSCW (Portland, September 1988).
2. Bullen, C. and Bennett, J. Groupware in Practice:
An Interpretation of Work Experience, Proc.
CSCW (Los Angeles, October 1990), 291-302.
3. Dyson, Esther Why Groupware is gaining Ground,
Datamation (March 1, 1990), 52-56.
4. Eveland, J.D. and Bikson, T.K. "Evolving
Electronic Communication Networks: An
Empirical Assessment," Proc. CSCW (Austin,
August 1986), 91-101.
5. Feldman, M.S. Electronic Mail and Weak Ties in
Organizations, Office: Technology and People, 3
(1987), 83-101.
6. Finholt, T. and Sproull, L.S. Electronic Groups at
Work, Organization Science, 1:1 (1990), 41-64.
7. Gash, D.C. and Orlikowski, W.J. Changing
Frames: Towards an Understanding of Information
Technology and Organizational Change, Academy
of Management Best Papers Proc., 51st Annual
Meeting (Miami Beach, August 1991), 189-193.
8. Govani, Stephen J. License to Kill, Information
Week (January 6, 1992), 22-28.
9. Groupware: The Teamwork Approach, Supplement
to PC Week, 8, 41 (October 14, 1991).
10. Grudin, J. Why CSCW applications fail: Problems
in design and evaluation of Organization Interfaces,
Proc. CSCW (Portland, September 1990), 85-93.
11. Kiesler, S. The Hidden Messages in Computer
Networks, Harvard Business Review (January-
February 1986), 46-59.
12. Kling, R. Cooperation, Coordination, and Control
in Computer-Supported Work, Comm. of the
ACM, 34, 2 (1991), 83-88.
13. Mackay, W.E. Diversity in the Use of Electronic
Mail, ACM Transactions on Office Information
Systems, 6:4 (1988), 380-397.
14. Markus, M. L.. Toward a 'Critical Mass' Theory
of Interactive Media, Communication Research,
14:5 (October 1987), 491-511.
15. Marshak, David S. Lotus Notes: A Platform for
Developing Workgroup Applications, Patricia
Seybold's Office Computing Report, (July 1990).
16. Perin, C. Electronic Social Fields in Bureaucracies
Comm. of the ACM, 34, 2 (1991), 75-82.
17. Sproull, L.S. and Kiesler, S. Reducing Social
Context Cues: Electronic Mail in Organizational
Communication, Management Science, 32, 11
(1986), 1492-1512.
18. Tyre, M.J. and Orlikowski, W.J. Windows of
Opportunity: Creating Occasions for Technological
Adaptation in Organizations, Sloan School of
Management #3309, MIT (Cambridge, July 1992).
CSCW'92 Proceedings 
November 1992
9
November 1992 roceedings
